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Incident · Senior

VTEX 07/13/2023: rollback doesn't stop the cascade and disaster recovery is needed

The rollback came in 12 min, but the cascade had already spread. Almost half of the sessions and orders worldwide were affected, part of the infrastructure was rebuilt, and one of the actions is a centralized cache flush.

14 min read · Incident on 2023-07-13, lasted · Source: VTEX · Content reviewed on October 23, 2026

Short answer

The rollback came in 12 min, but the cascade had already spread. Almost half of the sessions and orders worldwide were affected, part of the infrastructure was rebuilt, and one of the actions is a centralized cache flush. On July 13, 2023, at 15:02 UTC, VTEX's alarms indicated a possible global platform outage.

01 · CONTEXT

A global outage alarm

On July 13, 2023, at 15:02 UTC, VTEX's alarms indicated a possible global platform outage. The incident response team convened, identified a problem in the License Manager module, and began remediating it.

As you read, look for three things: what rolling back a deploy fixed and what it did not; how part of the degraded infrastructure is rebuilt, with a disaster recovery done under pressure; and what the company decided to change afterward, especially in the strategy for cache.

02 · TIMELINE

From the alarm to the degraded infrastructure

The official report records a sequence of milestones, all in UTC. The diagram shows only the components the text mentions and does not aim to reproduce the platform's internal dependencies.

  1. The team identified a problem in the License Manager module.

    Architecture diagram: Components cited in the global incident
    CLSessions and orders
    CPLicense Managerproblem identified
    CPOther modules
    CPUnderlying infrastructure
  2. At 15:14 UTC the team rolled back a deployment and observed gradual recovery of the License Manager.

    Architecture diagram: Components cited in the global incident
    CLSessions and orders
    CPLicense Managerdeploy rolled back
    CPOther modules
    CPUnderlying infrastructure
  3. The team also identified a cascading failure across several modules.

    Architecture diagram: Components cited in the global incident
    CLSessions and orders
    CPLicense Manager
    CPOther modulescascading failure
    CPUnderlying infrastructure
  4. At 15:36 UTC most of the cascade was mitigated, but part of the underlying infrastructure remained degraded and affected almost half of global sessions and orders.

    Architecture diagram: Components cited in the global incident
    CLSessions and ordersalmost half affected
    CPLicense Manager
    CPOther modules
    CPUnderlying infrastructuredegradada
What the report records
15:02 UTCAlarms fire for a possible global platform outage.
15:14 UTCA deployment is rolled back, with gradual recovery of the License Manager.
15:36 UTCMost of the cascading failure is mitigated; part of the underlying infrastructure remains degraded.
16:47 UTCA disaster recovery protocol begins to rebuild part of the degraded infrastructure.
19:26 UTCMore than 90% of the global sales flow is recovered.
23:20 UTCThe minor instability tied to above-normal order cancellations is resolved.

03 · THE ROLLED-BACK DEPLOY AND THE CASCADE

Rolling back helped the module, but did not end the incident

At 15:14 UTC the team rolled back a deployment and saw the License Manager gradually recover. The same report also says that a cascading failure across several modules was identified.

At 15:36 UTC most of the cascade was mitigated, but part of the underlying infrastructure remained degraded and affected almost half of global sessions and orders. The report also states that several actions increased platform stability, but not consistently up to 100%.

04 · DISASTER RECOVERY

Rebuilding part of the infrastructure

At 16:47 UTC, after several actions that did not consistently bring stability to 100%, VTEX initiated a disaster recovery protocol to fully rebuild part of the degraded infrastructure. A status update published during the incident said the process was taking longer than initially expected.

  1. Part of the underlying infrastructure was degraded and affected almost half of global sessions and orders.

    Architecture diagram: Disaster recovery and traffic redistribution
    CLSessions and ordersalmost half affected
    NWTraffic distribution
    CPDegraded infrastructuredegradada
    CPRebuilt infrastructure
  2. Disaster recovery began rebuilding part of the degraded infrastructure.

    Architecture diagram: Disaster recovery and traffic redistribution
    CLSessions and orders
    NWTraffic distribution
    CPDegraded infrastructure
    CPRebuilt infrastructurebeing rebuilt
  3. VTEX shifted traffic to the healthy infrastructure, taking care to avoid regression in the mitigations.

    Architecture diagram: Disaster recovery and traffic redistribution
    CLSessions and orders
    NWTraffic distribution
    CPDegraded infrastructure
    CPRebuilt infrastructure
  4. Over the next two hours, the sales flow went from almost half to almost 100%.

    Architecture diagram: Disaster recovery and traffic redistribution
    CLSessions and ordersflow recovering
    NWTraffic distribution
    CPDegraded infrastructure
    CPRebuilt infrastructure
  5. At 19:26 UTC more than 90% of the global sales flow was recovered, and soon afterward recovery reached 100%.

    Architecture diagram: Disaster recovery and traffic redistribution
    CLSessions and orders
    NWTraffic distribution
    CPDegraded infrastructure
    CPRebuilt infrastructurehealthy
Rolling back the deploymentDisaster recovery
What was doneA deployment was rolled back, with gradual recovery of the License Manager.Part of the degraded underlying infrastructure was rebuilt.
What the report records nextA cascading failure across several modules was identified.The sales flow went from almost half to almost 100% over the next two hours.

Even after recovery reached 100%, there was minor instability for some customers, with an above-normal order cancellation rate of about 2-5%, which was resolved at 23:20 UTC.

05 · ACTIONS AND THE DAY BEFORE

What VTEX decided to change

The report lists actions to avoid similar incidents. One of them is to monitor the system's deploy metrics earlier and identify services with no update for a certain period, as a way to ensure preventive change management.

Another is to redesign the strategy for cache across several services, with flush buttons that can be adjusted centrally. According to the report, this reduces the time to mitigate incidents, because it avoids having to provision capacity to invalidate certain caches.

  1. The action addresses caches used by several services.

    Architecture diagram: Cache with centralized flush
    CPSeveral services
    CHCaches
    CPCentral flush control
  2. The redesigned strategy includes cache flush buttons that can be adjusted centrally.

    Architecture diagram: Cache with centralized flush
    CPSeveral services
    CHCaches
    CPCentral flush controlcentral flush
  3. The report says this reduces mitigation time, because it avoids provisioning capacity to invalidate certain caches.

    Architecture diagram: Cache with centralized flush
    CPSeveral services
    CHCaches
    CPCentral flush control

The two reports are separate publications, and the global report does not mention the other; for that reason this text does not link one incident to the other as a cause. Compare the two as a pair, paying attention to what each learned about disponibilidade and about how much of the platform a failure can reach.

Frequently asked questions

What is VTEX 07/13/2023: rollback doesn't stop the cascade and disaster recovery is needed?

The rollback came in 12 min, but the cascade had already spread. Almost half of the sessions and orders worldwide were affected, part of the infrastructure was rebuilt, and one of the actions is a centralized cache flush.

What does the VTEX 07/13/2023: rollback doesn't stop the cascade and disaster recovery is needed design cover?

It is organized in these sections: A global outage alarm, From the alarm to the degraded infrastructure, Rolling back helped the module, but did not end the incident, Rebuilding part of the infrastructure, and What VTEX decided to change.

How long is VTEX 07/13/2023: rollback doesn't stop the cascade and disaster recovery is needed and what level is it?

It takes about 14 minutes to read and is rated Senior level.

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